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In order to properly model norm change in the law, temporal aspects of legal
dynamics must be considered. Since there exist several time-based features of
law that should be studied, we discuss two interesting approaches: one based
on defeasible logic and the other based on belief revision. Each of these makes
use of one of the two classic forms of reasoning about time: point-based and
interval-based. Both formalisms provide the necessary logical infrastructure to
address the characterization of complex behaviour of legal dynamics.
1 Introduction and Background
One peculiar feature of many normative systems, such as the law, is that it necessar-
ily takes the form of a dynamic normative system [24, 23]. Despite the importance of
norm-change mechanisms, the logical investigation of legal dynamics is still relatively
underdeveloped. However, recent contributions exist and this section is devoted to
a brief sketch of this rapidly evolving literature.
Alchourrón and Makinson were the first to logically study the changes of a legal
code [2, 3, 1]. The addition of a new norm n causes an enlargement of the code,
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consisting of the new norm plus all the regulations that can be derived from n. Al-
chourrón and Makinson distinguish two other types of change. When the new norm
is incoherent with the existing ones, we have an amendment of the code: in order to
coherently add the new regulation, we need to reject those norms that conflict with
n. Finally, derogation is the elimination of a norm n together with whatever part of
the legal code that implies n. Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [4] inspired by
the works above proposed the so called general AGM framework for belief revision.
This area has been proved to be a very fertile one and the phenomenon of revision
of logical theories has been thoroughly investigated. As is well-known, the AGM
framework distinguishes three types of change operation over theories. Contraction
is an operation that removes a specified sentence φ from a given theory Γ (a logically
closed set of sentences) in such a way as Γ is set aside in favour of another theory
Γ−φ which is a subset of Γ not containing φ. Expansion operation adds a given sen-
tence φ to Γ so that the resulting theory Γ+φ is the smallest logically closed set that
contains both Γ and φ. Revision operation adds φ to Γ but it is ensured that the
resulting theory Γ∗φ be consistent [4]. Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson argued
that, when Γ is a code of legal norms, contraction corresponds to norm derogation
(norm removal) and revision to norm amendment.
It is then natural to ask if belief revision offers a satisfactory framework for the
problem of norm revision in the law. Some of the AGM axioms seem to be rational
requirements in a legal context, whereas they have been criticised when imposed on
belief change operators. An example is the success postulate, requiring that a new
input must always be accepted in the belief set. It is reasonable to impose such a
requirement when we wish to enforce a new norm or obligation. However, it gives
rise to irrational behaviours when imposed to a belief set, as observed in [14].
The AGM operation of contraction is perhaps the most controversial one, due
to some postulates such as recovery [16, 32], and to elusive nature of legal changes
such as derogations and repeals, which are all meant to contract legal effects but
in remarkably different ways [16]. Standard AGM framework is of little help here:
it has the advantage of being very abstract—it works with theories consisting of
simple logical assertions—but precisely for this reason it is more suitable to capture
the dynamics of obligations and permissions rather than the one of legal norms.
Difficulties behind AGM have been considered and some research has been car-
ried out to reframe AGM ideas within reasonably richer rule-based logical systems
able to capture the distinction between norms and legal effects [28, 26]. However,
these attempts suffer from some drawbacks: they fail to handle reasoning on deontic
effects and are based on a very simple representation of legal systems.
In fact, it is hard in AGM to represent how the same set of legal effects can be
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contracted in many different ways, depending on how norms are changed. These
difficulties have been addressed in logical frameworks combining AGM ideas with
richer rule-based logical systems, such as standard or Defeasible Logic [26, 18] or
Input/Output Logic [8, 9, 28]. [32] suggested a different route, i.e., employing in
the law existing techniques—such as iterated belief change, two-dimensional belief
change, belief bases, and weakened contraction—that can obviate problems identified
in [16] for standard AGM.
In general, any comprehensive logical model of norm change in the law has to
take care of the following aspects:
1. the law usually regulates its own changes by setting specific norms whose pecu-
liar objective is to change the system by stating what and how other existing
norms should be modified; for instance, in most countries the Constitution
states that only the Congress have powers to lay and regulate taxes. Even
more, the Constitution states, by a norm, how to change or amend its own
body of norms.
2. since legal modifications are derived from these peculiar norms, they can be in
conflict and so are defeasible; for instance, some US states requires non-english
foreign driver licenses to be accompanied by the International Drivers Permit.
However, in 1989 US and Canada agreed to recognize each other’s licenses,
even french-written licenses. Hence, norms are contradictory regarding the
documentation that a french-canadian driver must show to authorities.
3. legal norms are qualified by temporal properties, such as the time when the
norm comes into existence and belongs to the legal system, the time when
the norm is in force, the time when the norm produces legal effects, and the
time when the normative effects hold. For instance, Belarus established that
several laws passed before 1996 ceased to be enforced in the exact moment
the President issues the new Constitution. In the United States, the 18th
Amendment prohibiting the manufacture of liquor was passed in 1919 and
repealed later in 1933. The end of this prohibition was established in turn
by another Amendment (the 21st) that also establishes that this amendment
“shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified (...) within seven years
from the date of the submission".
To sum up, AGM-like frameworks have the advantage of being very abstract but
work with theories consisting of simple logical assertions. For this reason, it is
perhaps suitable to capture the dynamics of obligations and permissions, not of
norms: the former ones are just possible effects of the application of norms and
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their dynamics do not necessarily require to remove or revise norms, but correspond
in most cases to instances of the notion of norm defeasibility [16].
Addressing the above aspects has triggered new research lines in recent years,
which break down in the following two approaches:
• Normative dynamics can be modelled by combining logical systems for tem-
poral and defeasible reasoning: previous works [15, 19, 16] have proposed to
combine Defeasible Logic with some basic forms of temporal logics;
• Another route is rather to enrich belief revision techniques by adding several
temporal dimensions: this has been done in works such as [29, 30].
The layout of the article is as follows. Section 2 introduces the importance of
time in legal norms and shows an example to motivate some ideas in the area of
legal dynamics. Section 3 summarizes the first approach mentioned above, in which
it is described how the Defeasible Logic was extended with temporal parameters
to allow for reasoning about the times specified inside norms, and it is described
how consider a legal system as a time-series of its versions, where each version is
obtained from previous versions by some norm changes. Section 4 summarizes the
second approach mentioned above, in which it is proposed a belief revision operator
that considers time interval in the revision process. Finally, in Section 5 conclusions
are offered and ideas for future work are given.
2 Preamble: Why Does Time Matter?
Legal norms are qualified by temporal properties, such as the time when the norm
comes into existence and belongs to the legal system or the time when the norm is
in force. Suppose that a municipality establishes that all taxis licensed since 2015
must be all-yellow, and a couple of years later the city adds a new rule establishing
that all taxis with license starting in 2018 must be all-black. Hence, the yellow-taxi
rule only applies for passenger cars with a valid license from 2015 to 2017. However,
this is true only years later, after the introduction of the black-taxi rule.
Since all these properties can be relevant when legal systems change, [17] argued
that failing to consider the temporal aspects of legal dynamics poses a serious limit
to correctly model norm change in the law.
2.1 The Problem and a Motivating Example
As we have briefly mentioned above, belief revision, and specifically the AGM
paradigm, has been advocated to be an elegant and abstract model for legal change.
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Its has been, however, argued that standard belief techniques do not capture the
following aspects of the law [17]:
1. the law regulates its own changes by issuing norms stating what and how other
norms should be modified;
2. legal modifications can be in conflict and so are defeasible;
3. legal norms are qualified by temporal properties, e.g. the time when the norm
is in force.
The general temporal model, as proposed in [17] assumes that all legal norms
are qualified by different temporal parameters:
• the time when the norm comes into existence and belongs to the legal system,
• the time when the norm is in force,
• the time when the norm produces legal effects (it is applicable), and
• the time when the normative effects (conclusions) hold.
Indeed, it is common legislative practice that, once a legal provision is enacted
(for example, the Italian 2018 budget law was enacted on 23 December 2017), its
force can for instance be postponed to a subsequent time (for example, the Italian
2018 budget law was in force since 1 January 2018). Similarly, a part of a certain
provision, which is in force since a certain time t, can be effective (i.e., can be
applied) since a different time t′ (for example, the Italian 2018 budget law, which
was in force since 1 January 2018, at art. 1, par. 253 states that par. 252 will
be applicable since 1 January 2019), or any provision can produce effects that hold
retroactively (for example, art. 1 of Italian 2018 budget law, par. 629, states that
certain tax effects cover cases since December 2017).
In [30], for example, the authors concentrate on issue 3 in the list above, i.e.,
how to integrate belief revision with time in the law. As regards issue 2, in that
article, the authors do not work directly on rule-based defeasible reasoning, but they
define a revision operator that may remove rules when needed or adapt intervals of
time when contradictory norms are introduced in the system: for instance, if n is
effective from 2001 to 2008 and a contradictory norm n′ is added at 2006, we know
that n is still effective from 2001 to 2005.
Let us now present a concrete example that serves to motivate the main ideas
proposed in [30], an approach that we will recall in Section 4. It involves information
and rules referring to intervals of time in which some taxes applies.
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Example 1. Consider the following pieces of information regarding a legislative
attempt to ease tax pressure for people that have been unemployed.
(a) A citizen was unemployed from 1980 to 1985.
(b) If unemployed from 1980 to 1983, then a tax exemption applies from 1984 to
1986, in order to increase individual savings.
(c) New authorities in government revoke tax exemption for years 1985 and 1986.
(d) Tax exemption reinstated for the year 1985 due to agreements with labor unions.
However, later on the legislator approved a new provision establishing that finally
there is no tax-exemption for all citizens for the years 1985 and 1986.
Here some rules are produced and, as it happens in legislative bodies, norms
change later according to the political and economical context. Rule (a) provides
time-bounded information: only between 1980 and 1985 the status of being unem-
ployed holds for a given citizen. Rule (b) states that if some property (unemployed)
holds between 1980 and 1983, then other property (tax exemption) holds between
1984 and 1986. Rule (c) establishes that this is no longer valid for a certain interval
of time. This means that, from now on, rule (b) of tax exemption should not be
applied in its original text. In other words, the intervals of rule (b) are revised ac-
cording to new political positions. Finally, rules are revised again as a consequence
of labor unions, only to be revoked later. In this example the general rule of tax-
exemption is revised several times. This revision is actually about the moments in
which this benefit can be applied. In fact, rule (c) solely demands a revision of the
interval for tax exemption. Hence, it cannot be the case that there is a rule in the
normative system that entails a tax exemption for 1985 and 1986. From (c) and (b),
it can be concluded that the benefit is only applied to 1984. Therefore, (b) should
be not used anymore and a new rule for 1984 should be introduced.
3 Defeasible Logic with Time for Modelling Legal Dy-
namics
Before illustrating in Section 4 how belief revision can be integrated by temporal
reasoning, we recall in this section the other approach that we mentioned in the
introduction.
In [15, 19, 16] Defeasible Logic was extended with temporal parameters. In
particular the authors temporalised propositional Defeasible Logic. This means that
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a temporal parameter is attached to the atomic elements of the logic, i.e., to the
atomic propositions. For the logic it is assumed a discrete totally ordered set of
instants of time T = {t0, t1, t2, . . . }. Based on this we can introduce the notion of
temporalised literals. Thus if l is a plain literal, i.e., l ∈ PlainLit, and t ∈ T then lt
is a temporalised literals. The intuitive interpretation of lt is that l is true (or holds)
at time t. Lit denotes the set of temporalised literals. Finally, given a time instant
t and y ∈ {pers, tran} we call the combination of (t, y) duration specification, and
literals labelled with a duration specification are called duration literals. The labels
pers and tran denotes the quality of being transient or persistent. A duration literal
has the form l(t,y). We denote the set of duration literals DurLit. The reasoning
mechanism occurs on a set of rules, which are supposed to represent legal rules. The
signature of rules is
Rule : 2Lit ×DurLit (1)
this means that a rule has the following form
r : at11 , . . . , atnn ↪→ c(t,y) (2)
where y ∈ {tran, pers} and hence the conclusion of the rule may be transient or
persistent.
The idea behind the distinction between a transient and persistent conclusion is
whether the conclusion is guaranteed to hold for a single instant or it continues to
hold until it is terminated. This is particular relevant for legal rules, since their con-
clusions are for example obligations (or, in general deontic effects), and obligations,
once triggered, remain in force until they are complied with, violated, or explicitly
terminated. Accordingly we can use the duration specification (t, tran) to indicate
that an obligation is in force at a specific time t, and must be fulfilled at that time,
while the duration specification (t, pers) establishes that a legal effect enters in force
at time t.
The inference mechanism extends that of Defeasible Logic taking into account
the temporal and durations specification. As in article [6], we equate arguments
with rules, thus this is the same as saying that there is a (defeasible) rule such that
all the elements in its antecedent are provable and the conclusion is p(t′,y). To assert
that p holds at time t we have the following steps:
1. Give an argument for p at time t′;
2. Evaluate all counterarguments against it. Here, we have a few cases:
(a) If the duration specification of p is (t, tran) (t′ = t), then, the counterar-




(b) If the duration specification of p is (t′, pers), then t′ can precede t and
we can ‘carry’ over the conclusion from previous times. In this case, the
counterarguments we have to consider are all rules whose conclusion has
a duration specification (t′′, z) such that t′ ≤ t′′ ≤ t.
3. Rebut the counterarguments. This is the same as the corresponding step of
basic defeasible logic, the only thing to pay attention to is that when we rebut
with a stronger argument, the stronger argument should have t′′ in the duration
specification of the conclusion.
The general idea of the conditions outline above is that it is possible to assert that
something holds at time t, because it did hold at time t′, t′ < t, by persistence, but
there must be no reasons to terminate it. Thus new information defeats previous
one.
3.1 From Rules to Meta-Rules
The temporal Defeasible Logic just presented allows for reasoning about the times
specified inside norms, but it is not able to capture the natural evolution of legal
systems, where new norms are issued, and existing norms are revised or derogated.
To obviate this problem [16] proposes to consider a legal system as a time-series of
its versions, where each version is obtained from previous versions by some norm
changes, e.g., norms entering in the legal system, modification of existing norms,
repeals of existing norms, . . . . This means that we can represent a legal system LS
as a sequence
LS(t1), LS(t2), . . . , LS(tj) (3)
where each LS(ti) is the snapshot of the rules (norms) in the legal system at time
ti. Graphically it can be represented by the picture in Figure 1.
A rule is a relation between a set of premises (conditions of applicability of
the rule) and a conclusion. The admissible conclusions are either literals or rules
themselves; in addition the conclusions and the premises will be qualified with the
time when they hold. Two classes of rules can be considered: meta-rules and proper
rules. Meta-rules describe the inference mechanism of the institution on which
norms are formalised and can be used to establish conditions for the creation and
modification of other rules or norms, while proper rules correspond to norms in a
normative system. In what follows we will use Rule to denote the set of rules, and
MetaRules for the set of meta-rules, i.e., rules whose consequent is a rule.
A temporalised rule is either an expression (r : ⊥)(t,x) (the void rule) or (r : ∅)(t,x)
(the empty rule) or (r : A ↪→ B)(t,x), where r is a rule label, A is a (possibly empty)
set of temporalised literals, B is a duration literal, t ∈ T and x ∈ {tran, pers}.
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Figure 1: Legal System at t′ and t′′
We have to consider two temporal dimensions for norms in a normative system.
The first dimension is when the norm is in force in a normative system, and the
second is when the norm exists in the normative system from a certain viewpoint.
So far temporalised rules capture only one dimension, the time of force. To cover
the other dimension we introduce the notion of temporalised rule with viewpoint.
A temporalised rule with viewpoint is an expression
(r : A ↪→ B)(t,x)@(t′, y), (4)
where (r : A ↪→ B)(t,x) is a temporalised rule, t′ ∈ T and y ∈ {tran, pers}.
Finally, meta-rules are introduced, that is, rules where the conclusion is not a
simple duration literal but a temporalised rule. Thus a meta-rule is an expression
(s : A ↪→ (r : B ↪→ C)(t′,x))@(t, y), (5)
where (r : B ↪→ C)(t′,x) is a temporalised rule, r 6= s, t ∈ T and y ∈ {tran, pers}.
Notice that meta-rules carry only the viewpoint time (the validity time) but not the
“in force” time. The intuition behind this is that meta-rules yield the conditions
to modify a legal system. Thus they specify what rules (norms) are in a normative
system, at what time the rules are valid, and the content of the rules. Accordingly,
these rules must have an indication when they have been inserted in a normative
system, but then they are universal (i.e., apply to all instants) within a particular
instance of a normative system.
Every temporalised rule is identified by its rule label and its time. Formally we
can express this relationship by establishing that every rule label r is a function
r : T 7→ Rule. (6)
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Thus a temporalised rule rt returns the value/content of the rule ‘r’ at time t. This
construction allows us to uniquely identify rules by their labels1, and to replace rules
by their labels when rules occur inside other rules. In addition there is no risk that
a rule includes its label in itself. In the same way a temporalised rule is a function
from T to Rule, we will understand a temporalised rule with viewpoint as a function
with the following signature:
T 7→ (T 7→ Rule). (7)
As we have seen above a legal system LS is a sequence of versions LS(t0), LS(t1), . . . .
The temporal dimension of viewpoint corresponds to a version of the legal system,
while the temporal dimension of a temporalised rule corresponds to the time-line
inside a version. Thus the meaning of an expression rtv @tr is that we take the
value of the temporalised rule rtv in LS(tr). Accordingly, a version of LS is just a
repository (set) of norms (implemented as temporal functions).
Accordingly, given a rule r, the expression rt@t′ gives the value of the rule (set
of premises and conclusion of the rule) at time t in the repository t′. The content
of a void rule, e.g., (r : ⊥)t@t′ is ⊥, while for the empty rule the value is the empty
set. This means that the void rule has a value for the combination of the temporal
parameters, while for the empty rule, the content of the rule does not exist for
the given temporal parameters. Another way to look at the difference between the
empty rule and the void rule is to consider that a rule is a relationship between a
set of premises and a conclusion. For the void rule this relationship is between the
empty set of premises and the empty conclusion; thus the rule exists but it does not
produce any conclusion. For the empty rule, the relationship is empty, thus there is
no rule. Alternatively, we can think of the function corresponding to temporalised
rules as a partial function, and the empty rule identifies instants when the rule is
not defined.
For a transient fully temporalised literal l(t,x)@(t′, tran) the reading is that the
validity of l at t is specific to the legal system corresponding to repository associated
to t′, while l(t,x)@(t′, pers) indicates that the validity of l at t is preserved when we
move to legal systems after the legal system identified by t′. An expression r(t,tran)
sets the value of r at time t and just at that time, while r(t,pers) sets the values of r
to a particular instance for all times after t (t included).
We will often identify rules with their labels, and, when unnecessary, we will drop
the labels of rules inside meta-rules. Similarly, to simplify the presentation and when
possible, we will only include the specification whether an element is persistent or
transient only for the elements for which it is relevant for the discussion at hand.
1We do not need to impose that the function is an injective: while each label should have only
one content at any given time, we may have that different labels (rules) have the same content.
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Meta-rules describe the inference mechanism of the institution on which norms
are formalised and can be used to establish conditions for the creation and modifica-
tion of other rules or norms, while proper rules correspond to norms in a normative
system. Thus a temporalised rule rt gives the ‘content’ of the rule ‘r’ at time t; in
legal terms it tells us that norm r is in force at time t. The expression
(ptp , qtq ⇒ (ptp ⇒ s(ts,pers))(tr,pers))@(t, tran) (8)
means that, for the repository at t, if p is true at time tp and q at time tq, then
ptp ⇒ s(ts,pers) is in force from time tr onwards.
A legal system is represented by a temporalised defeasible theory, called norma-
tive theory, i.e., a structure
(F,R,Rmeta,≺) (9)
where F is a finite set of facts (i.e., fully temporalised literals), R is a finite set of
rules, Rmeta is a finite set of meta rules, and ≺, the superiority relation over rules is
formally defined as T 7→ (T 7→ Rule × Rule) accounting that we can have different
instances of the superiority relation depending on the legal systems (external time)
and the time when the rules involved in the superiority are evaluated2.
The inference mechanism with meta-rules is essentially an extension of that of
temporal defeasible logic, but it involves more steps. Rules are no longer just given,
but they can be derived from meta-rules. Thus, to prove a conclusion x the first
thing to do is to see if it is possible to derive a rule r supporting x. But we have
to derive such rule at the appropriate time. Here, we want to remember that a
rule is a function from time (validity time or version of a legal system) to time
(when a rule is in force in a version of a legal system) to the content of the rule
(relationship between a set of premises and a conclusion). The basic intuition is
that a rule corresponds to a norm, and there could be several modifications of a
norm, thus deriving a rule means to derive one of such modifications. As we shall
see in the next section a meta-rule (or more generally a set of meta-rules) can be
used to encode a modification of a norm. In general it is possible to have multiple
(conflicting) modifications of a norm. Accordingly, to derive a rule, we have to
check that there are no conflicting modifications3 or the conflicting modifications
are weaker than the current modification. The final consideration is that in this
case we have two temporal dimensions, and the persistence applies to both.
2For instance, if we have s ≺2007Monday r and r ≺2007Tuesday s, it means that, according to the regulation
in force in 2007, on Monday rule s is stronger than rule r, but on Tuesday r is stronger than s.
3Two meta-rules are conflicting, when the two meta-rules have the same rule as their head, but
with a different content.
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3.2 An Example: Modifications on Norm Validity and Existence –
Annulment vs. Abrogation
The expression repeal is sometimes used to generically denote the operation of norm
withdrawal. However, at least two forms of withdrawal are possible: annulment and
abrogation.
An annulment makes the target norm invalid and removes it from the legal
system. Its peculiar effect applies ex tunc: annulled norms are prevented to produce
all their legal effects, independently of when they are obtained. Annulments typically
operate when the grounds (another norm) for annulling are hierarchically higher in
the legal system than the target norm which is annulled: consider when a legislative
provision is annulled (typically by the Constitutional Court) because it violates the
constitution.
An abrogation works differently; the main point is usually that abrogations oper-
ate ex nunc and so do not cancel the effects that were obtained from the target norm
before the modification. If so, it seems that abrogations cannot operate retroactively.
In fact, if a norm n1 is abrogated in 2012, its effects are no longer obtained after
then. But, if a case should be decided at time 2013 but the facts of the case are dated
2011, n1, if applicable, will anyway produce its effects because the facts held in 2011,
when n1 was still in force (and abrogations are not retroactive). Accordingly, n1 is
still in the legal system, even though is no longer in force after 2012. Abrogations
typically operate when the grounds (another norm) for abrogating is placed at the
same level in the hierarchy of legal sources of the target norm which is abrogated:
consider when a legislative provision is abrogated by a subsequent legislative act.
Consider this case:
Example 2 (Abrogation vs Annulment). [Target of the modification]
Legislative Act n. 124, 23 July 2008
Art. 1. With the exception of the cases mentioned under the Articles 90
and 96 of the Constitution, criminal proceedings against the President
of the Republic, the President of the Senate, the President of the House
of Representatives, and the Prime Minister, are suspended for the entire
duration of tenure. [. . . ]
In case of abrogation, we could have that the legislator enacts the following pro-
vision:
[Abrogation enacted and effective at 1 January 2011] Legislative
Act n. 124, 23 July 2008 is abrogated.
In case of (judicial) annulment, we would rather have
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[Annulment enacted and effective at 1 January 2011] On account
of Art. 3 of the Constitution [. . . ] the Constitutional Court hereby de-
clares the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 1 of the Act n. 124, 23 July
2008.
As we have recalled, the difference between the two cases is that the annulment
has retroactive effects. In particular, let us focus on the following provisions from
the Italian penal code:
Art. 157 Italian of Penal Code – Terms of statute-barred penal provi-
sions.
When the terms for statute-barred penal effects expire, the correspond-
ing crime is canceled [. . . ]
Art. 158 Italian Penal Code – Effectiveness of the terms of statute-barred
penal provisions
The effectiveness of terms of statute-barred penal provisions begins start-
ing from the time when the crime was committed.
Art. 159 Italian of Penal Code – Suspension of time limits for statute-
barred penal effects.
The terms for statute-barred penal effects [. . . ] are suspended whenever
the criminal proceedings are suspended under any legislative provisions
[. . . ]
Consider a hypothetical case where the Italian Prime Minister is accused in 2007
of accepting bribes at the beginning of 2006. Clearly, if Legislative Act n. 124 is
abrogated in 2011, since abrogation has no retroactive effects, art. 159 of Italian
Penal Code applied from 2008 to 2011, and so the counting of terms has been sus-
pended between these two years. Hence, from the perspective of 2011 (immediately
after the abrogation) the relevant time passed is two years and six months (2006,
2007, and until July 2008). Instead, if the act is annulled in 2011, more time has
passed from the perspective of 2011, because it is as if the Legislative Act n. 124
were never enacted: from 2006 until 2011.
As we can see, modeling retroactive legal modifications is far from obvious. The
logical model proposed in [16] and recalled in Section 3 offers a solution. In the next
section we will illustrate the intuition and apply to the above example of annulment
and abrogation.
3.3 Intermezzo – Temporal Dynamics and Retroactivity
As we have previously argued, if t0, t1, . . . , tj are points in time, the dynamics of
a legal system LS can be captured by a time-series LS(t0), LS(t1), . . . , LS(tj) of
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its versions. Each version of LS is like a norm repository: the passage from one
repository to another is effected by legal modifications or simply by temporal persis-
tence. This model is suitable for modeling complex modifications such as retroactive
changes, i.e., changes that affect the legal system with respect to legal effects which
were also obtained before the legal change was done.
t0
t0 t0










Figure 2: Legal System at t′ and t′′
The dynamics of norm change and retroactivity need to fully make use of the
time-line within each version of LS (the time-line placed on top of each repository in
Figure 2). Clearly, retroactivity does not imply that we can really change the past:
this is “physically” impossible. Rather, we need to set a mechanism through which
we are able to reason on the legal system from the viewpoint of its current version
but as if it were revised in the past: when we change some LS(i) retroactively, this
does not mean that we modify some LS(k), k < i, but that we move back from the
perspective of LS(i). Hence, we can “travel” to the past along this inner time-line,
i.e., from the viewpoint of the current version of LS where we modify norms.
Figure 2 shows a case where the legal system LS and its norm r persist from time
t′ to time t′′ and can have effects immediately from t′. Now, the figure represents
the situation where r is retroactively repealed at t′′ by stating that the modifica-
tion applies from t′′′ (which is between t′ and t′′) onwards. The difference between
abrogation and annulment is illustrated in Figures 3(a) and 3(b).
3.4 Modifications on Norm Validity and Existence: Annulment vs.
Abrogation (Cont’d)
On account of our previous considerations, the cases in Example 2 can be recon-
structed as follows.
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(a) Abrogation. In LS(t′) rule r pro-
duces a persistent effect b. Literal b
carries over by persistence to LS(t′′)
even if r is no longer in force.
t0
t0 t0









(b) Annulment. In LS(t′) rule r is ap-
plied and produces a persistent effect b.
Since r is annulled in LS(t′′), b must be
undone as well.
Figure 3: Abrogation and Annulment
Example 3 (Abrogation vs Annulment (cont’d)). First of all, for the sake of sim-
plicity let us
• only consider the case of Prime Minister (Legislative Act n. 124 mentions
other institutional roles),
• assume that the dates of enactment and effectiveness coincide and are generi-
cally 2008,
• the duration of tenure covers a time span from 2008 to 2012,
and formalize the corresponding fragment of art. 1 of Legislative Act n. 124 (23
July 2008) as follows:
L. 124 : (Crimex,Tenurex+y ⇒O Suspended(x+y,tran))(2008,pers))@(2008, pers)
The duration of tenure spanning from 2008 to 2012 is represented as follows:
r1 : (Elected2008 ⇒O Tenure(2008,pers))(2008,pers))@(2008, pers)
r2 : (Elected2008 ;O ¬Tenure2012)(2008,pers))@(2008, pers)
Arts. 157-159 of the Italian Penal Code state the following:
Art. 157 : (Crimex,Termsx+y ⇒O CrimeCancelled(x+y,pers))(z,pers))@(z, pers)
Art. 158 : (Crimex ⇒O Terms(x,pers))(z,pers))@(z, pers)
Art. 159 : (Crimex,Suspendedx+y ⇒O ¬Terms(x+y,tran))(z,pers))@(z, pers)
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As proposed by [16], the distinction between abrogation and annulment requires to
distinguish between void rules and empty rules. The content of a void rule, e.g.,
(r : ⊥)t@t′ is ⊥, while for the empty rule the value is the empty set. This means that
the void rule has value for the combination of the temporal parameters, while for the
empty rule, the content of the rule does not exist for the given temporal parameters.
Given a rule (r : A⇒ btb)tr @t, the abrogation of r at ta in repository t′ is basically
obtained by having in the theory the following meta-rule
abrr : ⇒ (r : ⊥)(ta,pers))@(t′, pers) (10)
where t′ > t. The abrogation simply terminates the applicability of the rule. More
precisely this operation sets the rule to the void rule. The rule is not removed from
the system, but it has now a form where no longer can produce effects. In the case
of the Legislative Act n. 124 (23 July 2008) we would have
abrL. 124 : ⇒ (L. 124: ⊥)(2011,pers))@(2011, pers)
Hence, we can have the following, for example
• at time x, from the viewpoint x we derive Suspendedx, 2008 ≤ x ≤ 2010;
• at time x, from the viewpoint x we show that we cannot derive Termsx, 2008 ≤
x ≤ 2010;
• at time 2011, from viewpoint 2011 we show that we cannot derive Suspended2011;
• at time 2011, from viewpoint 2011 we can derive Terms2011.
This is in contrast to what we do for annulment where the rule to be annulled
is set to the empty rule. This essentially amounts to removing the rule from the
repository. From the time of the annulment the rule has no longer any value. All
past effects are thus blocked as well.
The definition of a modification function for annulment depends on the underly-
ing variants of the logic, in particular whether conclusions persist across repositories.
Minimally, the operation requires the introduction of a meta-rule setting the rule r
to be annulled to ∅, with the time when the rule is annulled and the time when the
meta-rule is inserted in the legal system:
(annulr : ⇒ (r : ∅)(ta,pers))@(t′, pers) (11)
Hence,
(annulL. 124 : ⇒ (L. 124: ∅)(2008,pers))@(2011, pers)
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If we assume that conclusions persist over repositories we need some additional tech-
nical machinery to block pasts effects from previous repositories. In this case, since
L. 124 is modeled as a transient rule, we have basically to add a defeater like the
following4:
((annulef : ;O ¬Suspended2008)(2008,pers))@(2011, pers)
Hence, we now have, for example
• we can show that we cannot derive at x, from viewpoint 2011, Suspendedx,
2008 ≤ x;
• we can prove at x, from viewpoint 2011 Termsx, 2008 ≤ x.
As stated before, another approach to address a logical model of norm change
in the law is to enrich belief revision techniques by adding several temporal dimen-
sions, as done in [29, 30]. There, techniques from belief revision formalisms are
integrated with interval-based logical rules for legal systems, formalizing a revision
operator. This operator may remove rules when needed or adapt intervals of time
when contradictory norms are added in the system. This is discussed in the following
section.
4 Temporalising Belief Revision for the Law
Example 1 involves information and rules referring to intervals of time in which
some taxes applies. Cases like this, need to go beyond AGM machinery. Some
research has been carried out to reframe AGM ideas, some of these, within richer
rule-based logical systems [28, 26], and other, have aimed to study belief revision
for situations in which nonmonotonic reasoning is addressed [33, 25]. However, also
these attempts suffer from some drawbacks of standard AGM, among them the fact
that the proposed frameworks fail to handle the temporal aspects of norm change.
Unlike rich but complex frameworks such as the one of [17]—which we have
recalled in Section 3—we claim that belief revision techniques—which are based on
an abstract and elegant machinery—can be reconciled with the need to consider
several temporal patterns of legal reasoning. In [30] the authors are thus interested
in the formalization of a belief revision operator applied to an epistemic model that
considers rules and time. They enrich a simple logic language with an interval-based
model of time, to represent temporal dimensions such as the effectiveness of norms,
4The general procedure to block conclusions when conclusions persist over repositories can be
very complex: for all details, see [16].
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i.e., when norms are applicable. There, the revision operator may remove rules when
needed or adapt intervals of time when newer, contradictory norms are introduced in
the system. In particular, the idea is the formalization of a belief revision operator
that can address the evaluation of timed rules representing legal norms. Technical
aspects of temporalised knowledge are considered in the following sections.
4.1 Legal System as Temporalised Belief Base
The problem of representing temporal knowledge and temporal reasoning arises in
many disciplines, including Artificial Intelligence. A usual way to do this is to
determine a primitive to represent time, and its corresponding metric relations.
There are in the literature two traditional approaches to reasoning with and about
time: a point based approach, as in [17], and an interval based approach as in
[5, 12]. In the first case, the emphasis is put on instants of time (e.g., timestamps)
and a relation of precedence among them. In the second case, time is represented
as continuous sets of instants in which something relevant occurs. These intervals
are identified by the starting and ending instants of time.
The approach introduced in [30], time intervals (like in [7, 12]) are considered.
Following the semantics of the temporalised rules proposed in [17] and explained in
Section 3 (in an adapted version), the revision operator, in essence, consists in the
handling of intervals in order to maintain the consistency.
The above-mentioned temporal machinery is able to explicitly model two tem-
poral dimensions among those mentioned above in Section 2.1, that is the time of
norm effectiveness —i.e. when a norm can produce legal effects—and the time when
the norm effects hold [17].
In [30], a propositional language L with a complete set of boolean connectives:
¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔ is adopted and a consequence operator, denoted Cn(·), is used that
takes sets of sentences in L and produces new sets of sentences. In general, in this
article, we will write α ∈ Cn(A) as A ` α.
Note that the AGM model [4] represents epistemic states by means of belief
sets, that is, sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. Other models use
belief bases; i.e., arbitrary sets of sentences [13, 20, 31]. In [30], epistemic model is
based on an adapted version of belief bases which have additional information (time
intervals).
4.2 Time Interval
In [30] a universal finite set of time labels T = {t1, . . . , tn} strictly ordered is con-
sidered; each time label represents a unique time instant. Simplifying the notation,
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ti − 1 is the immediately previous instant to the instant ti and ti + 1 is the im-
mediately posterior instant to the instant ti. An interval is considered like a finite
ordered sequence of time labels ti, . . . , tj where i, j are natural numbers (i ≤ j) and
ti, . . . tj ∈ T denoting instances of time or timepoints. The discreteness of the flow of
time is appropriate for modelling norms dynamics since norms usually refer to time
in the spectrum of hours, days, months and years. Generally speaking, the law itself
views time as determined by discrete steps. Thus, let α ∈ L, we have expressions of
the type αinterval, where interval can be as follow:
• [ti, ti]: meaning that α holds at time ti. Following [17] α is transient (holding
at precisely one instant of time). For simplicity [ti, ti] = [ti].
• [ti,∞]: meaning that α holds from ti. Following [17] α is (indefinitely) persis-
tent from ti.
• [ti, tj ]: meaning that α holds from time ti to tj with ti < tj .
Then a set of time intervals I contains intervals as those described previously. Thus,
for simplicity, we can have expressions like αJ where J ∈ I. Intervals in I will
be denoted by uppercase Latin characters: A,B,C, . . . , Z. Then, throughout this
work αJ is a temporalised sentence meaning the sentence α has an effectiveness time
indicated by J . Then the semantics of classical propositional logic to a timed context
is preserved. A temporalised sentence α[ta,tb] is true when its non-temporalised
expression α is true in every time point t between ta and tb. In other words, α holds
at [ta, tb].
Naturally, two intervals may not be disjoint, as defined next.
Definition 1 (Contained interval). Let R,S ∈ I be two intervals. R is contained in
S, denoted R ⊆ S if and only if for all ti ∈ R it holds that ti ∈ S.
Definition 2 (Overlapped interval). Let R,S ∈ I be two intervals. R and S are
overlapped, denoted R>S if and only if there exists ti ∈ R such that ti ∈ S.
Example 4. Let R,S, V ∈ I where R = [t3, t7], S = [t4, t6] and V = [t5, t9] with
t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t9 ∈ T. Then S ⊆ R, R>V and S>V .
4.3 Temporalised Belief Base
As rules are part of the knowledge, they are subject of temporal effectiveness too.




meaning that the rule can derive that β holds from time tc to td if it is proved that
α holds from time ta to tb. The notion of persistence during a given interval could
be also applied to rules, although we adopt here a general approach. Note that
the above implication itself is not decorated with intervals, but α and β are. This
means that the implication always holds at [−∞,∞] and hence again the classical
semantics of first order logic is preserved. Thus, if the implication holds (since it is
not conditioned in time) and α holds at [ta, tb] then β holds at [tc, td].
Example 5. The provision from Example 1 “If unemployed from 1980 to 1983, then
a tax exemption applies from 1984 to 1986” can be formalised as follows:
Unemployed [1980,1983] → Tax_Exemption[1984,1986].
Thus, in [29], temporalised belief base which will contain temporalised sentences
(see Example 6) is defined. This base represents a legal system in which each tem-
poralised sentence defines a norm whose time interval determines the effectiveness
time.
Example 6. The set
K = {α[t1,t3], α[t4], α[t1,t4] → β[t4,t6],
β[t5,t6], β[t6,t8], β[t10], δ[t11],
δ[t11] → β[t15,t20], ω[t2,t8],
ω[t4] → β[t6,∞], ε[t1,∞]}
is a valid temporalised belief base for a legal system. Note that sentence ε is valid
(or true) from t1.
This type of belief base representation implies that a sentence can appear more
than once in a temporalised belief base, but from the point of view of the tem-
poralised sentences stored in the temporalised belief base there is no redundancy
because each temporalised sentence has different time intervals. For instance, con-
sider Example 6, where α and β appear twice, but with different intervals. Whenever
a sentence appears more than once with different intervals, just like β[t5,t6] and β[t10],
this sentence is said to be intermittent. Also note that if the intervals of a sen-
tence are overlapped or continuous through the knowledge base, like β[t5,t6], β[t6,t8]
in Example 6, the different occurrences are not collapsed into one, producing β[t5,t8].
This is for two main reasons. First, a knowledge base scanning procedure is needed
for identifying overlapped or continuous temporalised sentences, adding extra, yet
small, complexity which is not relevant for the belief revision operator discussed
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here. Second, in law this kind of reiteration of a sentence in different intervals is not
uncommon. For instance, the government may decide that there is a tax exemp-
tion during quarantine in March, and some weeks later then decide that the same
exemption also holds during April. Here there are two legal norms that conform
a continuous benefit, but with separate identities that can be revised for different
reasons. Even more, the continuity does not need to be so explicit: two different
continuous sentences like α[t1,tn], α[tn+1,tm] may be derived from different, separate
portions of the knowledge base, and even when it is clear that α holds from t1 to tm,
this wider interval will not be derived as it is. That is, as we will see below, a sen-
tence can be implicitly represented on a belief base by several different derivations
that maintain the validity of the sentence at overlapping intervals. In this case, it
could not be explicitly represented with a single sentence the validity of it at all
times.
4.4 Temporalised Derivation
Note that a norm can explicitly be in a temporalised belief base, as α[t5] ∈ K in
Example 6. However, a norm can implicitly be represented in a temporal belief
base if some conditions hold. For instance, in Example 6, norm β is implicitly
represented with ω[t2,t8], ω[t4] → β[t6,∞] due to the antecedent of the rule is held in
t4 by the temporalised sentence ω[t2,t8]. Next, the notion of temporalised derivation
for a sentence is introduced to capture this intuition. To do this, we first give a
definition of temporalised derivation in a time instant and then we give a definition
of temporalised derivation in time interval.
Definition 3 (Temporalised derivation in a time instant). Let K be a set of tem-
poralised sentences and α[ti] be a temporalised sentence. We say that α[ti] is derived
from K, denoted K `t α[ti], if and only if:
• αJ ∈ K and ti ∈ J , or
• βH → αP ∈ K and ti ∈ P and K `t β[tj ] for all tj ∈ H.
Definition 4 (Temporalised derivation in a time interval). Let K be a set of tempo-
ralised sentences and α[ti,tj ] be a temporalised sentence. We say that α[ti,tj ] is derived
from K (denoted K `t α[ti,tj ]) if and only if K `t α[tp] for all tp ∈ [ti, tj ].
Computing the temporalised derivation of a sentence through checking each in-
stant of the intervals is useful in special cases where implicit sentences need tempo-
ralised sentences with overlapped intervals as antecedents. To determine the time




Definition 5 (Temporalised consequence). Let K be a set of temporalised sentences
and α[ti,tj ] be a temporalised sentence. We say that α[ti,tj ] is a temporalised conse-
quence of K (α[ti,tj ] ∈ Cnt(K)) if and only if K `t α[ti,tj ].
Example 7. Consider again the temporalised belief base of Example 6. Then, K `t
β[t4,∞], that is, β[t4,∞] ∈ Cnt(K); and K `t α[t1,t4], that is, α[t1,t4] ∈ Cnt(K).
Following Definition 4, notice that the interval of an implicitly derived sen-
tence will be the interval of the consequent of the rule that derives the conclusion
of the proof. For instance, suppose that K = {γ[t2,t5], γ[t3,t4] → ε[t6,t9]} then the time
interval of ε is [t6, t9]. Thus, a temporalised sentence α[ti,tj ] is valid (or true) in K
if K `t α[ti,tj ].
Thus, in [30], a contradiction arises when two complementary sentences can be
derived with time intervals overlapped. For instance, suppose K = {α[t2,t9],¬α[t1,t3]},
in this case, there exists a contradiction. However, consider K = {α[t5],¬α[t1,t3]}, in
this case, we will say that K does not have contradictions. Moreover, a temporalised
belief base is temporally consistent if the base does not have contradictions. The
temporalised belief base of Example 6 is temporally consistent.
Remark 1. If K represents a legal system then K should be temporally consistent.
4.5 Legal Belief Revision
From a rational point of view, as was mentioned in Remark 1, a legal system should
be temporally consistent, i.e., it cannot contain contradictory norms at any time.
Hence, in [30], the authors propose a prioritised legal revision operator that
allows to consistently add a temporalised sentence α[ti,tj ] to a consistent legal system
K.
This special revision operator is inspired by the rule semantics explained above
in Section 4.1 (an adapted version from the one proposed in [17]). Thus, following
the concept of temporally consistency of Subsection 4.4, the revision operator may
remove temporalised sentences or, in some cases, may only modify the intervals to
maintain consistency.
To incorporate a norm ¬βJ into a legal system, it is necessary to consider all
possible contradictions that may arise if the norm is added without checking for
consistency. For this reason, it is necessary to compute all proofs of β considering
only those temporalised sentences βP whose effectiveness time is overlapped with
the time interval J , that is, J>P . Note that it is optimal to compute all minimal
proofs of a temporal sentence considering only those in which the time interval is
overlapped with the time interval of the input sentence. Next, a set of minimal
proofs for a sentence is defined.
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Definition 6 (Minimal proof). Let K be a temporalised belief base and αJ a tem-
poralised sentence. Then, H is a minimal proof of αJ if and only if
1. H ⊆ K,
2. αP ∈ Cnt(H) with J>P , and
3. if H′ ⊂ H, then αP 6∈ Cnt(H′) with J>P .
Given a temporalised sentence αJ , the function Π(αJ ,K) returns the set of all the
minimal proofs for αJ from K.
Remark 2. Each set of Π(αJ ,K) derives α in at least one time instant of J .
Example 8. Consider the temporalised belief base of Example 6. Then Π(β[t5,t6],K)
= {H1,H2,H3,H4} where:
• H1 = {α[t1,t3], α[t4], α[t1,t4] → β[t4,t6]},
• H2 = {β[t5,t6]},
• H3 = {β[t6,t8]},
• H4 = {ω[t2,t8], ω[t4] → β[t6,∞]}
Note that H1 is minimal: α should be derived from t1 to t4 to use the rule α[t1,t4] →
β[t4,t6] hence, α[t1,t3] and α[t4] should be in H1.
The construction of prioritised legal revision by a temporalised sentence is based
on the concept of a minimal proof; to complete the construction, an incision function
is used which selects in every minimal proof the sentence to be erased later and which
can produce legal effects in favour of a possible contradiction with the new norm.
The operator is based on a selection of sentences in the knowledge base that
are relevant to derive the sentence to be retracted or modified. In order to perform
a revision, following kernel contractions [21], this approach uses incision functions,
which select from the minimal subsets entailing the piece of information to be revoked
or modified. An incision function only selects sentences that can be relevant for α
and at least one element from each Π(αJ ,K):
Definition 7 (Incision function). Let K be a temporalised belief base. An incision
function σ for K is a function such that for all αJ ∈ Cnt(K):
• σ(Π(αJ ,K)) ⊆ ⋃(Π(αJ ,K)).
• For each H ∈ Π(αJ ,K), H ∩ σ(Π(αJ ,K)) 6= ∅.
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In Hansson’s approach it is not specified how the incision function selects the
sentences that will be discarded of each minimal proof. In this approach, this is
solved by considering those sentences that can produce legal effects in favour of
a possible contradiction with the new norm. Thus, if the new norm is ¬βJ then
the incision function selects the temporalised sentences βP or αQ → βF of each
Π(βJ ,K).
Definition 8 (Search consequence function). Sc: L × K 7→ K, is a function such
that for a given sentence α and a given temporalised base K with H ⊆ K,
Sc(α,H) = {αJ : αJ ∈ H} ∪ {βP → αQ : βP → αQ ∈ H and β ∈ L}.
Definition 9 (Consequence incision function). Given a set of minimal proofs Π(αJ ,K),





Example 9. Consider Examples 6 and 8. Then, Sc(β,H1) = {α[t1,t4] → β[t4,t6]},






= {α[t1,t4] → β[t4,t6], β[t5,t6], β[t6,t8], ω[t4] → β[t6,∞]}
As mentioned before, the revision operator may remove temporalised sentences
or, in some cases, may modify the intervals to maintain consistency. Next, a temporal
projection will be introduced based on a given time interval. The idea here is, given a
temporalised belief base K and given a time interval [ti, tj ], to return a temporalised
belief base K′ containing those sentences from K whose time intervals be out of
[ti, tj ].
Definition 10 (Excluding temporal projection). Let K be a temporalised belief base
and let [ti, tj ] be a time interval where ti, tj ∈ T. A excluding temporal projection of
K from ti to tj, denoted out(K, [ti, tj ]), is a subset of K where for all α[tp,tq ] ∈ K,
out(K, [ti, tj ]) will contain:
• α[tp,ti−1] if tp < ti, tq ≥ ti and tq ≤ tj,
• α[tj+1,tq ] if tp ≥ ti, tq > tj and tp ≤ tj,
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• α[tp,ti−1] and α[tj+1,tq ] if tp < ti, tq > tj,
• α[tp,tq ] if tq < ti or tp > tj.
Remark 3. Note that when tp ≥ ti and tq ≤ tj, the temporal sentence is not
considered. In this case, this sentence is erased.
Remark 4. Note that if δ[th,tk] ∈ out(K, [ti, tj ]) and the interval [th, tk] is generated
through excluding temporal projection of K from ti to tj then there exists a temporal
sentence δ[tp,tq ] in K such that [th, tk] ⊆ [tp, tq].
Example 10. Consider Example 9 and suppose that S is a temporalised belief base
and S = σc(Π(β[t5,t6],K)). Then, out(S, [t5, t6]) = {α[t1,t4] → β[t4], β[t7,t8], ω[t4] →
β[t7,∞]}.
Following the notion of excluding temporal projection (Definition 10) a norm
prioritised revision operator is defined. That is, an operator that allows to consis-
tently add temporalised sentences in a temporalised belief base. If a contradiction
arises, then the revision operator may remove temporalised sentences or modify the
corresponding intervals in order to maintain consistency.
Definition 11. Let K be a temporalised belief base and αJ be a temporalised sen-
tence. The operator “ ⊗”, called prioritised legal revision operator, is defined as
follow:
K⊗ αJ = (K \ σc(Π(¬αJ ,K))) ∪ out(σc(Π(¬αJ ,K)), J) ∪ {αJ}.
Note that, to add αJ to K, all temporized sentences that have ¬α as a conse-
quence and contribute to derive some instant of ¬αJ are erased. Then, these same
sentences are added but with their modified intervals (using the excluding temporal
projection introduced in Definition 10). Finally, αJ is added.
Example 11. Consider Example 6 and suppose that a new norm ¬β[t5,t6] it is wished
to add. To do this, it is necessary to do K ⊗ ¬β[t5,t6]. Consider Examples 8 and
9. Then, K ⊗ ¬β[t5,t6] = {α[t1,t3], α[t4], α[t1,t4] → β[t4], β[t7,t8], β[t10], δ[t11], δ[t11] →
β[t15,t20], ω[t2,t8], ω[t4] → β[t7,∞], ε[t1,∞], ¬β[t5,t6]}. Note that, this new temporalised
base is temporally consistent.
The following example shows how our operator works in a particular situation




Example 12. Consider the following temporalised belief base K = {β[t1,t10], β[t1,t5] →
α[t1,t5], β[t6,t10] → α[t6,t10], δ[t4]}. Note that, K `t α[t1,t10] because K `t α[ti] for all
ti ∈ [t1, t10]. Suppose that it is necessary to adopt ¬α[t1,t10]. To do this, it is neces-
sary to compute all the minimal proofs of α[t1,t10] in K. In this case, Π(α[t1,t10],K) =
{{β[t1,t10], β[t1,t5] → α[t1,t5], β[t6,t10] → α[t6,t10]}}. Then, S = σc(Π(α[t1,t10],K)) =
{β[t1,t5] → α[t1,t5], β[t6,t10] → α[t6,t10]}. Thus, out(S, [t1, t10]) = ∅. Therefore, K ⊗
¬α[t1,t10] = {β[t1,t10], δ[t4],¬α[t1,t10]}.
4.6 Others works that have discussed the relation between belief
revision and temporal reasoning
There are some works in the literature that have discussed the relation between
belief revision and temporal reasoning, though none of them addressed the issue in
the normative domain. Two prominent lines of investigation are [10, 11] and [27].
[10, 11] address belief revision in a temporal logic setting. These articles consider
sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. In contrast to this, the approach
proposed in [30] is based on an adapted version of belief bases which have additional
information (time intervals). The use of belief bases makes the representation of the
legal system state more natural and computationally tractable. That is, following
[22, page 24] and [31], it is considered that legal systemsâĂŹ sentences could be
represented by a finite number of sentences that correspond to the explicit beliefs on
the legal system. The main purpose of [10, 11] is to represent the AGM postulates
as axioms in a modal language. The assumption is that belief revision has to do
with the interaction of belief and information over time, thus temporal logic seemed
a natural starting point. The technical solution is to consider branching-time frames
to represent different possible evolutions of beliefs. Hence, belief revision operators
are interpreted over possible worlds. Unlike this, the authors in [30] work with legal
system in which each temporalised sentence defines a norm whose time interval
determines the effectiveness time. Then, the revision process defined in [30] may
remove temporalised sentences or, in some cases, may only modify the intervals.
[27] is based on a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus ex-
tended to deal with belief. The authors add to this framework a notion of plausibility
over situations, and show how to handle nested belief, belief introspection, mistaken
belief, belief revision and belief update together with iterated belief change.
An interesting line of investigation is to study possible correlations with these two
last research lines in literature as compared to the system proposed in [30]. Such
a comparison cannot be directly done from technical viewpoint for two reasons.
First of all, [30] is specifically focused in a propositional language following kernel
contraction construction proposed in [21]. Second, the propositional language in
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[30] is equipped with explicit time-stamps and with temporal intervals, which allow
them for expressing richer temporal specifications in the language.
5 Conclusions
In order to properly model norm change in the law, temporal aspects of legal dy-
namics must be considered. Several reasons support this idea. The law regulates
its own changes by stating, within the system, what and how other existing norms
should be modified. The introduced new norms can be in conflict and so norms
are defeasible by nature. Even more, legal norms are qualified by diverse temporal
properties, such as the time when the norm is added to the legal system, or when
the norm is in force and it produces legal effects. Thus, all these aspects may be
addressed by two different pathways, as reflected in the literature. First, normative
dynamics can be modelled by combining logical systems for temporal and defeasi-
ble reasoning [15, 19, 16]. Second, belief revision techniques can be enriched with
temporal dimensions: this has been done in works such as [29, 30]. These are two
different approaches to the consideration of time within a logical framework for legal
dynamics.
Defeasible Logic was extended with temporal parameters to allow for reasoning
about time specified inside norms. Two temporal dimensions are considered: the
first one is when the norm is in force in a normative system, and the second is when
the norm exists in the normative system from a certain viewpoint. Usually only the
time of force is considered, but here the notion of temporalised rule with viewpoint is
introduced, a mechanism through which it is possible to reason on the legal system
from the viewpoint of its current version but as if it were revised in the past. This
extension increases the expressive power of the logic and it allows us to represent
meta-norms describing norm modifications by referring to a variety of possible time-
lines through which conclusions, rules and derivations can persist over time. This
formalism has been shown useful to model retroactive legal modifications, a complex
timed behaviour of legal systems that requires special attention. Hence, this model
is suitable for modeling changes that affect the legal system with respect to legal
effects which were also obtained before the legal change was done. This is not a
simple feature and the formalism addresses it properly.
On the other hand, a contrasting approach explores the importance of time in
legal dynamics from the point of view of revision of beliefs in laws. This make sense
since the law is a dynamic system of rules. Indeed, a very complex one: as times
goes by, rules are introduced in the system, which may be either unexpectedly in
conflict with existing rules or be intended to provide new, different norms for society.
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This demands a consistent revision of the rules of the system, so an extension of
classic belief revision formalism seems to be appropriate. Then, we discussed here
the second approach, which proposes a belief revision operator that considers time
interval in the revision process. Intervals are used to model a period of time for
a piece of knowledge to be effective or relevant, leading to the definition of a new
kind of temporal rules. On these interval-decorated rules the corresponding tempo-
ralised derivation was defined. The consideration of time requires an adaptation of
the notions of contradiction and inconsistency in the classical sense. Temporalised
knowledge base is inconsistent only if contradictory information can be derived for
the same moment of time. In that approach was defined a novel belief revision
operator that allows the consistent addition of temporalised sentences in a tempo-
ralised belief base. If a contradiction arises, then the revision operator may either
completely remove conflictive temporalised sentences or modify the intervals of some
rules. This last action is made because a given consequence a at interval I may fall
in contradiction during a sub-interval of I. Thus, a should be a consequence, after
the revision, only for the rest of I. Then, intervals in rules should be taken into
account for the revision process.
The central idea of this research topic is that formal models of norm change must
address the fact that new norms may be elicited and old norms may need to be re-
tracted, with complex consequences. Depending on the particular feature of legal
dynamics intended to be modelled, any proposed framework requires an appropriate
model of time. There are two mainstream approaches to reasoning with and about
time: point based and interval based. Here we explored both flavours, by discussing
two different, interesting approaches to the consideration of time within the study
of legal dynamics. Both formalisms take time into account and provide the neces-
sary logical infrastructure to address the characterization of complex behaviour of
dynamics in normative systems, constituting solid foundations for further research.
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